The sub-prime shakedown continues to rumble through Wall Street and other financial centers around the world. The latest causality is not a hedge fund or investment vehicle, but Bear Stearns' co-President Warren Spector. Allegedly, Mr. Spector was pressured into quitting his job by long-time colleague, Bear Stearns CEO James Cayne. Perhaps, Mr. Spector will be seen as a scapegoat - as the big bank's stock has fallen 27% this year alone and because of the bank's losses in the sub-prime market - than as a practical move.
At the same time mortgage lenders continue to examine their relationship with non-bank mortgage brokers. The Wall Street Journal reported that NovaStar Financial Inc. will resume making sub-prime mortgages through mortgage brokers at a time when many lenders have halted such practices because of late payments and defaults.
Andrew Davidson, of Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc., recently authored a report in his company's publication, "The Pipeline," explaining what he saw went wrong in the sub-prime meltdown. He mostly explored the relationship between borrowers, lenders, brokers, and investors. "What went wrong in the sub prime mortgage market is that the people responsible for making loans had too little financial interest in the performance of those loans and the people with financial interest in the loans had too little involvement in how the loans were made," he wrote.
In his report, entitled "Six Degrees of Separation," Mr. Davidson identifies the actors involved in creating sub-prime mortgages: the borrower, broker, mortgage banker, "aggregator" (usually a broker-dealer who buy loans and then packages the loans into a securitization that is sold to investors), CDO managers, and investors. The Six Degrees of Separation report makes for an interesting read and can be viewed here.
One of the more interesting relationships that Mr. Davidson explores is the one between the rating agencies and CDO institutions. "In the CDO market, the criteria of the rating agency determines whether or not the transaction will occur. ... If the rating agency establishes criteria that allow the institution to borrow money at a low enough rate or at high enough leverage, then the CDO can purchase assets more competitively than other financial institutions. If the CDO has a higher cost of debt or lower leverage, than it will be at a disadvantage to other buyers and will not be brought into existence. If the CDO is created, the rating agency is compensated for its ratings. If the CDO is not created, there is no compensation. My view is that there are very few institutions that can remain objective given such a compensation scheme."
Amid all the bad news about the sub-prime market, it can be expected that politicians, who have written up regulations based on news headlines more now than ever, will want to control lending practices and underwriting standards. Critics have said, and in my view, that such regulations are not sincere in cleaning up the industry, but aim to score cheap political points. Lawrence Lindsey wrote a piece in last Friday's Wall Street Journal (Mortgage Madness) about some of the reckless proposals that Sen. Chuck Schumer and others are tinkering with.
In Mr. Davidson's report he also opined that such regulations clamping down on mortgage origination practices, such as limiting the types of loans allowed or establishing minimum underwriting requirements, would have dire consquences. "... underwriting requirements may be counter productive since they may limit the availability of credit to those who need it and deserve it." However, Mr. Davidson did believe that regulatory action should focus on the separation between origination and investment.
These are some of the issues that will be discussed at IncreMental Advantage's Oct. 16 Hedge Fund Due Diligence Conference in NYC. For more information please visit www.incrementaladvantage.com.